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Creating the Machinery for Joint Intelligence: 
The Formative Years of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1936-56  
 
 
 
Abstract: 
The Joint Intelligence Committee was created in 1936 to remedy the lack of centralisation in 
British intelligence, and to ensure that the best possible assessments were provided to military 
planners.  Though it occupied a peripheral position in the inter-war period, it quickly rose in 
prominence during the Second World War, and from 1942 was involved in every defining 
moment of the war.  Its post-war future was secured by 1944 and a succession of able chairman 
ensured its role as a crucial facet of decision-making.  This article charts these developments 
and focusses on the expansion of intelligence as a function of central government.   
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Creating the Machinery for Joint Intelligence: 
The Formative Years of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1936-56  
 
Origins of the JIC 
 
On Tuesday 7 July 1936, a few weeks before the spectacular opening by Adolf Hitler of the 
Berlin Olympics, seven men sat around a large ornate table in a four storey building just 
opposite the entrance to Downing Street to discuss what was known of the growing military 
challenge that Germany posed for the British Empire.  Six of the men were officers representing 
the intelligence staffs of the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force.  The seventh was a 
shadowy civilian whose background was in an organisation that had then no official existence, 
the Secret Intelligence Service.  The building in which the meeting was taking place, No. 2 
Whitehall Gardens, had made history before when an earlier occupant, Benjamin Disraeli, had 
held meetings of his Cabinet there.1  Now the large ornate rooms, modelled in the French style 
similar to the interior of the Palace at Versailles, housed the Committee of Imperial Defence 
(CID) and the Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee and it was at their direction that the key figures 
in British intelligence were meeting formally in committee for the first time.  Outside the storm 
clouds gathered and as the clock chimed 11 o'clock in the Secretary’s Room on the first floor 
the chairman, a Brigadier in the East Yorkshire Regiment, opened proceedings.2  The Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) had come into being. 
                                                          
DISCLAIMER: This paper is drawn only from released official records and published sources and the views 
expressed are mine in my capacity as an academic historian.  They do not represent the views or carry the 
endorsement of the Government.  This article draws upon M.S.Goodman.  The Official History of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee, Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis. (Routledge: 
London, 2014). 
1 W F Moneypenny, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield (London: John Murray, 1920). p.285. 
2 The weather forecast is courtesy of the Meteorological Office archive.  I am grateful to Glyn Hughes for this 
information. 
3 
 
 The JIC is one of Whitehall’s longest serving Committees.  Its origins can be traced 
back to a decision in 1936 to remedy the lack of co-ordination in the intelligence community.  
For the first twenty years of its existence, the JIC remained a sub-committee of the Chiefs of 
Staff (COS) Committee.  Its creation, rationale, composition, and focus were overwhelmingly 
military, yet it was born out of the political anxieties over the military rise of Nazi Germany.  
It reached maturity in dealing with the very different concerns of the Cold War and the threat 
of nuclear annihilation. As it developed its own personality, the JIC became a key component 
in British and allied politico-military debates.  It was responsible for the invention of modern 
all-source intelligence assessment, as it is known in Britain today, and the development of 
intelligence analysis as a function supporting government as a whole (and not just the naval, 
military and air staffs).  It brought military planners to a greater appreciation of the contribution 
of intelligence, including that from civilian agencies.  Later a similar closeness was forged 
between Whitehall’s foreign and defence policy-makers and the intelligence chiefs, not least 
from having to argue their disagreements to reach a consensus on JIC papers.  Finally, the JIC 
was the first example of the development of a governing body for a national intelligence 
community, overseeing the interactions between individual agencies and departments, liaising 
with overseas services, establishing requirements for intelligence and assessing performance.   
 The birth of the JIC itself was not easy; nor did it progress according to any 
preconceived plan.  It evolved to meet the needs of national survival and global war.  It helped 
that in its early years the JIC had the advantage of access to perhaps the most comprehensive 
intelligence on the enemy ever known: the work of Bletchley Park on ULTRA.3  After the 
Second World War such success in breaking enemy cyphers was difficult to emulate and 
through the formative years of the Cold War the British intelligence community struggled to 
reach the levels of penetration and insight against its principal adversaries achieved during 
                                                          
3 For more, see F.H.Hinsley.  British Intelligence in the Second World War.  (London: HMSO, 1979-90). 
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1939-45.4  The JIC achieved some notable successes but also suffered from some serious 
failings.  Ironically, perhaps, the major factors leading to its achievements were mirrored by 
the factors contributing to its shortcomings.  Its performance was a natural consequence of a 
committee based on consensus, inter-departmental working, and operating at the interface 
between the worlds of intelligence and policy. 
 At the time of the JIC’s creation in 1936, Britain controlled territories across the globe 
and occupied a position of international authority.  Across Europe this power balance was 
beginning to shift, with the growing presence of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Soviet 
Russia.  Despite these political developments, ‘Intelligence’ was very much military in focus 
and scope and was concerned primarily with gauging capabilities.5  The three Services each 
had dedicated intelligence branches; it was problems in their working relationship and 
disagreements about their analyses that ultimately led to the formation of the JIC.   
 The stimulus for its creation lay with Major General John Dill, the Director of Military 
Operations and Intelligence, yet it would be the great Whitehall ‘man of secrets’, Sir Maurice 
Hankey, who would turn Dill’s vision into reality.  Dill had wished to create a body that would 
avoid the duplication of effort in the three Services’ intelligence branches, and would be 
charged with ensuring that the best possible intelligence was used for planning.6  Hankey’s 
practical solution was to create a sub-committee of the COS Committee, thereby ensuring that, 
from the outset, intelligence and planning were closely aligned.7   
The pre-war JIC was a committee that almost entirely comprised military personnel, 
reporting to military masters, and working on military topics.  Its remit meant that it could only 
produce assessments on topics that had been pre-determined by the COS; it could not and did 
                                                          
4 On this, see R.J.Aldrich.  GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency.  
(London: HarperPress, 2010). 
5 See M.S.Goodman, ‘Learning to Walk: The Origins of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee’, International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21 (2008), pp.40-56. 
6 Details are in TNA: CAB 54/3. 
7 Details are in TNA: CAB 21/2651. 
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not commission its own papers.  This meant that, for instance, there were no assessments on 
the changing balance in Europe; nor were there any on Hitler’s or Mussolini’s intentions.  The 
main thrust of the JIC’s pre-war focus was on the Spanish Civil War, yet here lessons were not 
heeded.  Concluding that the conflict was amongst second class military powers, the JIC wrote 
that there could be nothing to be learnt and applied for any future war with Germany, because 
she was a first class military power.8 
Nonetheless, the changing nature of the ‘threat’ and the role of intelligence had meant 
that, by the summer of 1939, it was considered necessary to include the Foreign Office (FO).  
To secure its involvement the FO began to chair the meetings.9  This helped ensure that by the 
outbreak of war in September 1939, the JIC had become as much a strategic assessment body 
as a producer of tactical military intelligence reports for the planners.  Despite this broadening 
into the politico-military sphere, it remained a sub-committee of the COS, whose focus had to 
be geared towards military matters.  It was only in 1940, for instance, that the intelligence 
agencies MI5 and SIS would become permanent members.10   
 
Wartime 
 
The wartime JIC was undoubtedly a success.  It rose from being a small and specialised 
gathering of military intelligence officers on the fringes of government into a fully-fledged and 
integral component of the government’s war machine.  Two significant events towards the start 
of the war put the JIC on a correct footing for what would transpire.  The intelligence failure 
to foresee the German invasion of Norway in April 1940, complemented by Winston 
Churchill’s accession in May 1940, ensured that the JIC’s position was elevated, as was its 
                                                          
8 For instance, see JIC 40, ‘Report No 1: Anti-Aircraft (Artillery) Defence’, 6 October 1937.  TNA: CAB 56/3. 
9 W9975/9805/49, Note by R.C.Skrine Stevenson [the FO’s first Chairman], 1 August 1939.  TNA: FO 
371/23901. 
10 JIC(40)34th Meeting, 24 May 1940.  TNA: CAB 81/87. 
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ability to commission its own papers.11  A number of other factors contributed to this step-
change in its fortunes.  In 1941 the JIC was given its own dedicated team of drafters.  This 
ensured that committee members could now concentrate on more important matters than 
spotting missing commas; it practice it meant that the quantity and quality of assessments 
improved dramatically.12  The addition of ULTRA intelligence undoubtedly also made a 
difference to the nature of the JIC’s product.13  The final and, arguably, most important aspect 
was the JIC’s wartime Chairman, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck (see below).14   
The role of individuals would be highly significant for the success of the JIC.  The 
Committee had nine Chairmen during this period.15  It would be a committee chaired by either 
the FO or the army.  In fact that would remain the case until the Franks Report in 1983, when 
the chairmanship moved to the Cabinet Office, though as it happened the next few incumbents 
were all former FO people anyway, either on secondment or transfer to other departments.  The 
first two chairmen were relatively short-lived and achieved little, largely because meetings at 
that time were infrequent and relatively inconsequential.   
The reason that the army provided the first three chairs is simple: this was a military 
sub-committee of the COS concerned exclusively with military matters.  One of the early 
debates concerned the Spanish Civil War and the lessons that might be learnt from that conflict 
for the future of aerial bombardment in war.  This reflected an argument between the Admiralty 
                                                          
11 See D.Stafford Churchill and Secret Service (London: Abacus, 1997); Also, G.Bennett Churchill’s Man of 
Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence (London: Routledge, 2007).  On the JIC’s new 
commission, see COS(40)360, ‘Urgent Intelligence Reports’, 17 May 1940.  TNA: CAB 80/11. 
12 ‘Joint Intelligence Staff’, Paper by Major General Davidson [Director of Military Intelligence, War Office], 6 
October 1941.  TNA: CAB 163/5. 
13 ‘The Value and Use of Special Intelligence in JIC Work’, Paper in the Admiral John Godfrey archive.  TNA: 
ADM 223/107. 
14 For a contemporary’s view see K. Strong.  Men of Intelligence: A Study of the Role and Decisions of Chiefs of 
Intelligence from World War I to the Present Day (London: Cassell, 1970). pp.115-8. 
15 Brigadier Desmond F. Anderson [Army] July 1936 – December 1937; Brigadier Roger Evans [Army] 
February 1938 – July 1938; Brigadier Frederick G. Beaumont-Nesbitt [Army] November 1938 – July 1939; 
Ralph C. Skrine Stevenson [FO] August 1939 – December 1939; Victor F.W. Cavendish-Bentinck [FO] 
December 1939 – August 1945; Harold A. Caccia [FO] November 1945 – August 1946; William G. Hayter 
[FO] October 1946 – November 1950; D. Patrick Reilly [FO] November 1950 – April 1953; Patrick H. Dean 
[FO] May 1953 – July 1960. 
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and Air Ministry and so it was thought best to have the army chair meetings.  That was the 
official reason; the unofficial reason was that no-one seemingly wanted the navy in charge.16 
Brigadier Frederick Beaumont-Nesbitt was the first chairman to really make much of a 
difference.  After joining the Grenadier Guards in 1912 he had a varied and fascinating career, 
including: the Military Attaché in Paris; Deputy, and then Director, of Military Intelligence; 
and Military Attaché in Washington at the time that the Americans joined the war.  In 
reminiscing about his early years in the army, Beaumont-Nesbitt recalled that as a ‘callow 
youth’ it was a ‘miracle’ that he survived.  Indeed, his memoirs reveal a litany of pranks whilst 
a young officer, including memories of a champagne-infused stag party and how his appendix 
almost burst upon being told he was to be sent to fight in the First World War.17 
On taking the chair, Beaumont-Nesbitt conducted a review of the existing intelligence 
arrangements, resulting in a twelve-page report which he submitted in December 1938.  He 
began by distinguishing between ‘military intelligence’ and ‘political intelligence’ and 
recommended the existing Committee be enlarged, with the ‘inclusion of a senior FO 
representative, who would also be asked to act as Chairman’.  This proposal was important 
because, in his words, it would stop any ‘vested interests’ from becoming ‘too powerful’.18   
It would take a series of external events and internal changes before Beaumont-
Nesbitt’s vision would take hold.  In the meantime he had been replaced as Chairman by the 
diplomat, Ralph Skrine Stevenson.  His appointment was only ever supposed to be short-lived 
and upon chairing his first meeting he’d already known that he was shortly to move on.19  His 
successor would transform the JIC. 
                                                          
16 For more, see Goodman.  The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee. 
17 F.G.Beaumon-Nesbitt.  Memoirs, 1893-1918.  (Unpublished).  Liddell Hart Archive for Military History, 
King’s College London: Beaumont-Nesbitt Papers.  See also his obituary in The Times (21 December 1971), 
p.12. 
18 See Beaumont-Nesbitt’s report and cover note to Hollis, 21 December 1938. TNA: CAB 21/2651. 
19 X7763/G.  Letter from C.Howard Smith [Foreign Office] to E.Hale [Treasury], 8 August 1939.  TNA: FO 
366/2382. 
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Heir to the Duke of Portland and a relative of the Duke of Devonshire, Victor 
Cavendish-Bentinck had a privileged Victorian upbringing, enjoying a brief military career 
before joining the FO in 1918.  He was posted to a number of European capitals, and was 
involved in some of the most important discussions of the inter-war period.  Always dressed 
immaculately in striped trousers and black jacket, Cavendish-Bentinck could often be found 
walking across St. James’ Park accompanied by his pet dog, who would sit with him in the FO 
each day.  Unsurprisingly, it was not long before Angus, a Kerry Blue Terrier who had earlier 
served with his master in Chile, became known as the ‘Intelligence Dog’.20  Unfortunately 
Angus would become one of the war’s casualties.  Kennedy Walker-Sloan, one of Cavendish-
Bentinck’s FO colleagues who worked with him on the JIC later in the war, recalled how one 
day he was taking Angus for a walk when ‘crossing Hyde Park Corner he [Angus] spied another 
dog coming up Constitution Hill, he shot out and ran straight under a taxi.  I had the awful 
business of explaining to Bill [as Cavendish-Bentinck was known to friends] that his little 
poodle was no longer with us.’21 
Cavendish-Bentinck was clearly adept at dealing with senior figures in the military, 
almost all of whom outranked him.  He was skilful at chairing the Committee and ensuring that 
any disagreements were resolved, particularly the sometimes fraught relationship between the 
military and the FO.  Most importantly, he was able to represent the JIC at meetings of the COS 
Committee and of senior policy officials in Whitehall and to finesse the inevitable bureaucratic 
wrangling to ensure that the JIC was influential at the top of government.22   
 The other great wartime figure to mention is the Committee’s Secretary, Denis Capel-
Dunn.  Born in Leipzig in 1903, Capel-Dunn studied Modern Languages with History at Trinity 
                                                          
20 P Howarth, Intelligence Chief Extraordinary: The Life of the Ninth Duke of Portland. (London: Bodley Head, 
1986). p.130. 
21 Interview with K.Walker-Sloan.  24 March 2010. 
22 For more see Goodman.  The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee. pp.61-158. 
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College, Cambridge, though it appears he never graduated.23  Following a brief spell in the 
Diplomatic Service, including a stint at the British Embassy in Havana, Capel-Dunn read for 
the Bar and in 1938 started practise as a Barrister.24  Capel-Dunn was also a member of the 
Essex Regiment Territorial Army, and seems to have divided opinion, with John Colvin, who 
knew Capel-Dunn through their membership of the St James’ Club, recalling him as ‘very fat, 
extremely boring...his conversations were hideously detailed and humourless.  We all disliked 
him very much indeed’.25  This was a minority view though and the record certainly seems to 
have been in Capel-Dunn’s favour, and his achievements within the JIC and his plans for post-
war British intelligence were numerous and significant.  As Secretary, Capel-Dunn was 
responsible not just for minute taking, but for ensuring the smooth operation of the Committee.  
Sadly things did not end well for him.  He had been in San Francisco in the summer of 1945 
taking part in the creation of the United Nations Charter and, together with several British 
officials had been aboard a plane leaving Montreal for London that had gone missing on 3 July 
1945.  Although no body was found, the search for Capel-Dunn was abandoned in mid-July 
and he was presumed dead.26 
At the same meeting where Capel-Dunn’s death was announced to JIC members, 
Cavendish-Bentinck informed colleagues that he was leaving to become Ambassador in 
Warsaw.27  Cavendish-Bentinck and Capel-Dunn were to leave an indelible mark on Britain’s 
intelligence community.  In order to understand why, it is necessary to go back to the early days 
of the war and the first significant intelligence failure that was to befall British intelligence. 
                                                          
23 I am grateful to Jonathan Smith, the Trinity College archivist, for this information. 
24 I am grateful to his son, Barnaby Capel-Dunn, for this biographical information. 
25 ‘Obituary: John Colvin’, The Daily Telegraph (17 October 2003).  It is also mentioned in ‘Awful Widmerpool 
is Unmasked At Last’, The Daily Telegraph (30 December 1991).  Rather cruelly Anthony Powell had based the 
character of Widmerpool in A Dance to the Music of Time on Capel-Dunn; the dramatisation needs to be read in 
the context that Capel-Dunn refused to keep Powell on his staff.  
26 ‘A Liberator Missing, British Officials on Board, San Francisco Staff’, The Times (7 July 1945). 
27 JIC(45)55th Meeting (O), 14 August 1945.  TNA: CAB 81/93. 
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The real opportunity for the JIC came after the failure to foresee the German invasion 
of Norway in 1940, followed shortly afterwards by Churchill’s accession to power and his 
unstinting support for intelligence work.  Churchill believed in the value of intelligence and 
gave the JIC freedom to operate independently.28  Despite insisting on reading much single-
source reporting, he also valued the all-source assessed product of the JIC.29   
 Although the personalities of its chairman and secretary were important, the JIC would 
still never have been able to establish itself so firmly without confidence in its own 
assessments.  As the stature of the JIC increased so, too, did its involvement in the war effort.  
From 1941 onwards the JIC was briefing the COS Committee weekly and all planning papers 
were expected to have an intelligence input.  The creation, that same year, of a dedicated 
drafting team meant the JIC members could concentrate on the highest priorities, and this 
reinforced the conclusion that the JIC was now fundamental to the war effort.30  That did not 
mean that JIC reports were always read or judgments agreed with but, by and large, intelligence 
was seen as an essential component of policy-making.   
By 1945 the JIC had been involved, in one way or another, in supporting Allied 
decision-making in all aspects of war planning.  From Operation TORCH in 1942 onwards, the 
JIC was similarly an integral component of every single major British operation.  TORCH and 
OVERLORD, the cross-channel invasion of North West Europe, characterised this role.  The 
JIC was involved in a variety of aspects, from the protection of code-words, tactical summaries 
on the disposition of the enemy and an expectation of what opposition might be encountered, 
to broader strategic assessments on how the conduct of the war might be affected as a result.  
This variety of roles was reflected in its broader output, ranging from general assessments of 
                                                          
28 JIC(40)71, ‘Urgent Intelligence Reports’, 17 May 1940.  TNA: CAB 81/97. 
29 For instance, M.Gilbert.  Continue to Pester, Nag and Bite: Churchill’s War Leadership.  (London: Pimlico, 
2004). p.13. 
30 JIC(41)222, ‘A Combined Inter-Service Intelligence and Planning Committee’, 24 May 1941.  TNA: CAB 
81/102. 
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strategy; monthly reports on the signs of German collapse; weekly papers, based on ULTRA, 
on what the enemy knew and might expect of Allied plans; to multiple daily operational 
products on the on-going nature and conduct of the war.  Although few of the daily operational 
and tactical reports have been preserved, it is quite clear that this was the hidden JIC success 
story of the war.31     
 
Post-War 
 
One of the great lessons that emerged from the wartime experience was that intelligence would 
be central to any future conflict.  Not only this, but the inter-war period had shown that detailed 
planning took years and it would be unrealistic to expect the intelligence community to rapidly 
shift priority or increase its capabilities.  With this in mind, the JIC began to look towards the 
post-war world in late 1944.  The first tangible result was a report on the post-war ‘Intelligence 
Machine’, written for the JIC in January 1945.  Its authors, Cavendish-Bentinck and Capel-
Dunn, characterised the Committee as fundamental to the future of British intelligence.  Service 
budgets and the size of the armed forces were correctly assumed to decline in the inevitable 
austerity of the post-war world.  They argued perceptively, therefore, that this would increase 
the reliance of British forces in the future on having a steady and reliable stream of intelligence, 
including strategic warning of the emergence of new threats.  The guarantor that this 
requirement would be met was to be the JIC, through its co-ordinating role and the continuation 
of its agreed interdepartmental, consensus-based approach to assessments involving policy 
makers as well as intelligence chiefs.32   
                                                          
31 For more, see Goodman.  The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee. 
32 ‘The Intelligence Machine’, 10 January 1945.  TNA: CAB 163/6.  For a more detailed examination see 
M.Herman, ‘The Post-War Organization of Intelligence: The January 1945 Report to the Joint Intelligence 
Committee on “The Intelligence Machine”’, In R Dover & M S Goodman (eds), Learning from the Secret Past: 
Cases in British Intelligence History (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2011). This includes a copy of 
the report itself. 
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 Following the end of the Second World War, as the threat from Soviet and later Chinese 
communism emerged, along with the rise of anti-colonial movements, one of the great 
difficulties facing British intelligence was that it had to adjust to operating against targets on 
which there was little current knowledge.  The intelligence dominance achieved through 
ULTRA could not be repeated.33 The intelligence community had, in particular, to try to assess 
the intentions and the future military capabilities of the Soviet Union with initially very little 
hard evidence to go on.  The demand was for a much more strategic level of analysis than had 
been the staple diet of the Committee during the military operations of the war.  Yet it also 
retained a tactical dimension, visible in the ‘Weekly Survey of Intelligence’, its commentary 
of current events, and particularly evident at times of crisis.34   
The JIC’s first major post-war challenge was to determine the future direction of Soviet 
policy.  Herein lay a problem though.  A disagreement had arisen between the FO and the COS 
over attitudes to the Soviet expansion of influence in Eastern Europe.  The former did not want 
to risk antagonising Britain’s wartime ally, whereas the latter argued that post-war contingency 
planning had to be undertaken on the basis of a hostile Soviet Union.35  A consensus on policy 
towards the Soviet bloc was not reached until several years after the end of the war, essentially 
brought about by the actions of those in the Kremlin.  In the meantime, though, the restrictions 
that had been imposed by the FO on intelligence gathering against the Soviet target hampered 
collection efforts.36 The JIC, as the co-ordinator and effective manager of the intelligence 
community, led discussions with the COS and Ministers about procuring greater funds and 
resources for the intelligence effort.  Although results were, unsurprisingly, slow, by the early 
                                                          
33 A fascinating review in 1950 considered the ‘wartime advantages now lacking’.  See JIC(50)81(Final), 
‘Present State of Intelligence and Measures to Improve It’, 3 November 1950.  TNA: CAB 158/22. 
34 The Weekly Survey of Intelligence, or the Red Book as it became known due to its front cover, are retained in 
their entirety.  A selection of the less sensitive version that covered the same ground, the Weekly Review of 
Intelligence or the Grey Book, have been released.  See TNA: CAB 179. 
35 For a more detailed examination see J.Lewis. Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War 
Strategic Defence, 1952-1947 (London: Frank Cass, 2003); also Goodman, The Official History of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee. pp.225-35. 
36 JIC(46)1(0)(Final)(Revise), ‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions’, 1 March 1946.  TNA: CAB 81/132. 
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1950s the intelligence community had regained some of this lost time and effort on the Soviet 
target.37  Furthermore, great strides had been taken in reinforcing the close wartime Anglo-
American intelligence relationship and reciprocal cooperation was bearing fruit.38  This was 
crucial to Britain’s efforts but, equally, the diversification of the Cold War brought new 
challenges, particularly in the form of decolonisation and the JIC’s global remit. 
 A succession of crises ensured that the JIC’s position within government as an 
authoritative source of assessment was secure, even though it was not able to accurately predict 
several important events, including the Berlin Blockade, the invasion of South Korea by the 
North, and the intervention of the Chinese in the Korean War.39  Nevertheless, the Committee’s 
performance in steadying the Whitehall ship in rough water was effective: it is clear that senior 
readers of the JIC product appreciated its sober analysis and examination.  Whilst its strategic 
forecasting sometimes failed, its operational analyses of the resulting situation were generally 
accurate.  The exception to this rule were its broader analyses of events in the Middle East, 
which were initially coloured by seeing the influence of Moscow as greater than it probably 
was.40  The Suez crisis concluded a turbulent first twenty years for the JIC.  It revealed a number 
of important factors, not least the manner in which the JIC chairman’s role proliferated, but 
more broadly it tested to the limits the JIC’s formula of bringing intelligence chiefs together 
with officials in policy departments to reach key judgments to inform (or not) Government 
decisions.41   
 
                                                          
37 JIC(54)31(Final), ‘State of Our Intelligence on the Communist Bloc and Measures to Improve It’, 8 June 
1954.  Cited in Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee. p.256. 
38 An interesting first-hand account is provided in W.C.Matthias, America’s Strategic Blunders: Intelligence 
Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991 (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2003). 
39 In 1951 the JIC undertook its first serious retrospective analysis of previous assessments, focusing on each of 
these instances as examples of intelligence failure.  See JIC(51)87(Final), ‘Review of Assessments Made of 
Communist Intentions Since January, 1947 by the Joint Intelligence Committee’, 12 December 1951.  TNA: 
CAB 158/13. 
40 For instance, JIC(50)20(Final), ‘Communist Influence in the Middle East’, 21 April 1950.  TNA: CAB 158/9. 
41 Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee. pp.368-418. 
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The Machinery for Joint Intelligence 
 
Despite its disparate membership – representatives were drawn from the three Services, 
intelligence, and diplomatic worlds – meetings of the JIC were cordial, sober, serious, and 
driven by a desire to achieve consensus.  The JIC performed more than an assessment role, 
important though this was.  It formed a motor for the central intelligence machinery: an 
organisation that linked the intelligence world with the policy and military worlds through 
numerous sub-committees and subordinate regional offshoots.  In essence, the JIC in the 1950s 
was carrying out four main functions:  
i) producing joint, inter-departmental assessments;  
ii) guiding the national intelligence effort by considering, at a senior level, the annual 
requirements for intelligence and overseeing intelligence liaisons and other 
community issues;  
iii) helping to bring together the resource requirements of the intelligence agencies and 
lobbying on their behalf for greater funds;  
iv) and exercising a responsibility for the security of sensitive material.   
 
Beyond this, however, was the broader value increasingly derived by the UK, from having such 
a variety of senior people from the worlds of policy and intelligence sit down around a table 
once every week, argue their way to consensus. 
Positive perceptions of the JIC were assisted, undoubtedly, by those who sat on the 
Committee itself.  From the dry records of the proceedings of the JIC it is difficult to single out 
the contributions of an individual to the workings of a Committee, but there are tangible 
glimpses of the quality of administration and diplomatic skill that Cavendish-Bentinck and his 
successors brought to his task.  He described the role of Chairman as being akin to ‘a sort of 
conductor’.42     
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Cavendish-Bentinck’s successor was Harold Caccia.  An old Etonian and a rugby 
player, he was cited on one occasion in The Times as having ‘run well and opened up the game 
by means of a number of accurate and well-timed passes to the wings’.43  Caccia had joined 
the FO in 1929, subsequently serving in China, and as Assistant Private Secretary to Foreign 
Secretaries Anthony Eden and Lord Halifax, followed by stints in Greece and Algiers.  Caccia 
returned to the FO and in November 1945 assumed Chairmanship of the JIC, though he 
remained in post only until August 1946.  Unfortunately there are no records that tell us 
anything of Caccia’s style as Chairman.  Lord Sherfield, his predecessor as Ambassador in 
Washington, has written that Caccia was ‘short, stocky, and bald with a fair complexion.  He 
was forthright in speech and energetic in action, and he retained throughout his life a cheerful 
and light-hearted, almost boyish, manner, which concealed a serious and thoughtful 
disposition’.44 
 Caccia’s successor as Chairman was another high flyer.  William Hayter entered the FO 
in 1930, subsequently serving in Vienna, Moscow, China and Washington.  He returned to 
London in 1944, and in October 1946 became the JIC’s seventh Chairman.  One contemporary 
in the FO has written that during his time in Washington, Hayter was the man who passed on 
the message to London that Pearl Harbor had been attacked.  Remembered as ‘able, polished, 
and with an academic turn of mind…only his closest friends broke through the canopy of charm 
to discover real warmth in his personality’.  Hayter’s FO career culminated as Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union; he resigned in 1958 over his ‘disillusionment over Suez’.45   
Patrick Reilly took over as Chairman in January 1950, remaining in post until April 
1953.  Reilly had joined the FO in 1933, serving in Tehran, Algiers, Paris, and Athens.  Unlike 
his predecessors, Reilly had already had a varied and in-depth involvement with the 
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intelligence world, having spent approximately a year in the middle of the war as the personal 
assistant to the Chief of SIS.46  Following his spell on the JIC Reilly became Ambassador, 
firstly to the Soviet Union and then to France, and was also for a time a Deputy Under-Secretary 
in the FO.   
The final Chairman in this period was Patrick Dean.  His FO career started unusually.  
Graduating in law he was called to the bar in 1934, and then worked as a barrister until the 
outbreak of war, when he accepted a position as one of the FO’s legal advisers.  In this capacity 
he was involved with the Nuremburg war crimes trials, following which he was offered, and 
accepted, a position in the Diplomatic Service.  He was subsequently made head of the German 
Political Department and served in the Embassy in Rome, before returning to London where, 
in April 1953, he became Chairman of the JIC.  He served in that position for seven years, 
eventually leaving in July 1960 to become the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to 
the UN, followed by a stint as Ambassador in Washington.  Dean has been described as ‘utterly 
straightforward and loyal both to his superiors and to his subordinates…although clear-sighted 
and sometimes harsh in his judgments of people he was invariably courteous and tolerant of 
colleagues who fell short of his standards.’47   
In one respect their task was a simple one, for as the COS put it: ‘the Chairman should 
inspire initiative and drive in the conduct of intelligence work.’48  Chairing the JIC was not a 
full-time job, and all the post-war figures were also either head of the Permanent Under-
Secretaries Department (PUSD) – the part of the FO that liaised with the agencies – or the 
Deputy Under Secretary responsible for intelligence within the FO.  In practice the incumbent 
was responsible for FO liaison with SIS (including GCHQ) and MI5; for looking after the FO’s 
security department; and for providing FO representation at the COS meetings, the JIC 
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meetings (including chairing), and the Joint Planners meetings.  Furthermore ‘representation’ 
was a two-way street, involving a constant dialogue back and forth between the FO and relevant 
departments.  Chairing the JIC was, therefore, not a full-time or sole position; rather it was one 
task among many.49   
The FO chairman’s role ensured that a clear and unequivocal link existed between 
intelligence assessment, community management, operational planning, and the formulation of 
foreign policy.  Yet, the events surrounding Patrick Dean’s role over Suez in 1956 tested the 
practice of placing the FO policy-making and the intelligence role of the JIC Chairman in the 
hands of the same official.  Suez revealed a general disconnect between the political, military 
and intelligence planning machineries, with the JIC Chairman intimately involved in all three 
but unable satisfactorily to influence any of them. 
 What was it like working on and with the JIC?  A fascinating glimpse into this is 
provided by Chester Cooper, an American representative in London in the mid-1950s, one of 
whose tasks was to act as liaison with the drafters of the JIC reports, the Joint Intelligence Staff 
(JIS).  Occasionally Cooper would be asked to attend a JIS meeting, and in his memoir he 
recalls the first time he did so:  
I was ushered into a gloomy, crowded, and cluttered conference room dominated 
by a table covered with a green, tea-stained baize cloth.  A dozen or so men were 
slumped in chairs at the table or haphazardly seated around the room…the 
owlish-looking man next to me (who mumbled “economist, JIB” when we were 
introduced) was thoughtfully absorbed in a Greek pentameter he was composing.  
The navy commander on my other side was dozing…the door flew open and 
someone shouted, “240 for 6!” I heard cheers and groans.  The intruder slammed 
the door behind him.  I barely had a chance to make my profound 
contribution…when there was a gentle knock on the door.  The navy officer 
stirred himself, opened the door, and happily announced, “Elevenses!”  Tea and 
biscuits were passed around.  And then, once again, the door swung open and 
the mysterious interloper yelled, “310 for 8!”…I quickly learned that my first 
impression of this group was completely wrong.  Yes, they were laconic.  Yes, 
cricket, elevenses, afternoon tea, and Greek pentameters were nontrivial 
                                                          
49 This description is provided by Reilly.  Reilly papers: c.6920, folio 222.  Further details can be found in 
JIC/1017/47, ‘Review of Intelligence Organisation’, 26 September 1947.  CAB 163/7. 
18 
 
considerations…But, as I was soon to discover, they were bright…they were 
also serious and hardworking.50 
 
If Cooper had been startled by his first experiences of London, then it is fair to say that his 
British counterpart in Washington had a similar baptism:  
I was introduced to each individual member by the Chairman…Thereafter the 
members sat down removing what clothing they thought fit.  The gentleman on 
my right removed his shirt and vest and remained clad in a pair of bright red 
braces depicting a pair of very undressed ladies.  The chair on my left was 
empty.  The late arrival sat down and apparently did not feel the heat as he 
retained his hat and coat throughout the proceedings.  More than half the 
members sat through-out with their feet on the table.  You can imagine my 
feelings when I thought back on the meetings in the JIC in London! 51 
 
Consensus lay at the heart of JIC considerations: any assessment distributed with a JIC 
appellation had been signed up to and agreed by all constituent members and it was here that 
the disparate membership of the Committee was, in many ways, invaluable.  The only personal 
view of this comes from an Assistant Secretary of the JIC in the 1950s, who many years later 
recalled that of the meetings themselves the ‘atmosphere was good’, and ‘even if two 
departments were arguing on different sides of the coins; it was done in a very civilised fashion.  
I didn’t see any fights break out.’  Of the members the chairman was ‘always dominant’.  The 
‘standard of debate’ was good and this was all thanks to the FO Chairman, whose quality was 
‘always high’.52   
 Yet producing consensus could be problematic. The first difficulty lay in actually 
reaching an agreement in the first place. JIC papers in this period were drafted by individual 
members of the JIS, who were not effectively divorced from their parent organisations, and 
whilst they were supposed to be free from any departmental biases, they were also responsible 
for liaising with them to gather information.  In an attempt to ensure consistency and consensus 
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the JIS was regularly given very specific parameters within which to work.  These often 
involved the starting assumptions for the report, as well as the questions that were to be 
addressed.  It would not be an exaggeration to say that although the JIC was, from its early 
days, permitted to propose its own papers, in attempting to satisfy its readership it became too 
reliant on questions set by its military masters.  Indeed, the JIC was not averse to re-writing a 
paper if the COS Committee was not happy with it.53  Ordinarily, once finished and approved, 
all the JIC papers were then transmitted to the COS for further endorsement which, generally 
speaking, they received.  It was then up to the COS to distribute the papers further as they saw 
fit.  Receipt of papers from the JIC was important, for it was recognised that they represented 
‘the official opinion of the UK intelligence organisation’.54   
Another result of seeking consensus was the tendency to word assessments in an 
equivocal manner, presumably to satisfy all concerned and avoid the need to include dissenting 
judgments.  The intent was to have language that was clear and concise, yet at times those 
interacting with the JIC must have been left bewildered.  Consider the following point on future 
Soviet actions of which the JIC wanted the COS Committee to take note: ‘…the JIC thought 
that we could always count on a congenital inability on the part of the Russians to resist any 
temptation to resort to opportunist overt tactics incompatible with the conduct of a genuine 
Calming Campaign’.55 
The JIC’s most important and recognisable task was the production of intelligence 
assessments. A 1951 retrospective study by the JIC concluded that, on the whole, it had 
performed well in monitoring Soviet actions, though with some notable failures in predicting 
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Soviet moves.56  Several assumptions underlay its assessments of the Soviet Union, ranging 
from the conclusion in the early 1950s that Germany was the key to the Cold War, to the belief 
that Moscow’s reach was global even if its underlying trait was to be cautious.57  The JIC 
developed with the military intelligence staffs a huge list of indicators that would suggest the 
Soviet Union was preparing for war.58  In addition to set-piece assessments it provided a weekly 
summary of worldwide current events.  The nature of the JIC’s work encompassed what now 
would be called the functions of horizon scanning, of prediction, early-warning, explanation, 
and situational awareness.  This last function was important because the JIC maintained an 
organisational structure that could be mobilised and expanded when the need arose. 
Understanding the mentality of the Soviet leadership, particularly after the harrowing 
experiences of the war with Germany, was hard.  The JIC struggled to comprehend whether 
Stalin’s actions in the early Cold War period were examples of defensive paranoia or offensive 
expansionism.59  The JIC believed that a key to solving this dilemma was to understand how 
quickly the Soviet Union would be able to economically recover and reconstruct.60  It was 
concluded early on by the JIC that overtly the Soviets would be cautious and that whilst 
employing deceit and cunning as a tactic, war would be a final resort.61  This assumption, 
immensely difficult to prove or disprove, was soon applied to other theatres.   
In the Far East, at least initially, the JIC correctly did not detect the hand of Moscow, 
though it judged that any indigenous action by client states would need Moscow’s approval.  
In the Middle East, by contrast, particularly in the case of Palestine and Iran, the strength of 
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nationalism and communism became conflated in the JIC’s view, and the Committee tended to 
identify underhand tactics on the part of the Soviet Union, even if there was no explicit 
evidence to support such a judgment.62  In the case of Nasser, for example, the JIC was inclined 
to equate his anti-British stance with a pro-Soviet one.63  The difficulty in all of these instances, 
as Percy Cradock has observed, was ‘in attributing rational motivation to the other side.’64  The 
general lack of high level, reliable and verifiable intelligence had an impact on the quality of 
analysis.  There is an obvious point here: that intelligence assessment tends to be as strong, or 
as weak, as the intelligence collection which feeds it.   
 To its credit the JIC frequently began assessments by highlighting the immense 
difficulties in gathering intelligence, including gaps in its knowledge.  A typical example was 
the opening phrase ‘we do not have any good sources of information’.  Whether its readership 
appreciated such candour was not commented upon, but certainly it was good practice to 
expose the problem.   Issues with intelligence collection underlined the importance of another 
aspect of the JIC’s work – liaison.  This was conducted at a strategic level and its role and 
importance can be best demonstrated by the turbulent relationship with the US intelligence 
community.  The war effort ensured that British and American intelligence agencies needed to 
collaborate, and the UK from the outset assumed the role of senior partner.  This assumption, 
at least on the British part, continued into the immediate post-war period whilst President 
Truman established a post-war US intelligence community.  However, British intelligence 
increasingly had to rely upon US sources to make up for gaps in its own coverage.  Rapidly the 
balance of power shifted across the Atlantic and the Americans, with their far greater resources, 
became the dominant partner.  On the whole the JIC worked well with its US counterparts, but 
initial difficulties in comprehending the shifting nature of the relationship, together with the 
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impact of political rulings on intelligence collaboration (particularly over colonial conflicts and 
the diplomatic recognition of communist China) created tensions.65   
 The inherent difficulties of trying to avoid surprise, of producing predictive 
assessments, of attempting to impose a rational explanation of events only dimly perceived, 
pose epistemological problems of the highest order.  The performance of the JIC cannot solely 
be judged by how often it was surprised by dramatic events.  It is also important to recognise 
that the JIC made an important contribution to day to day planning and policy.  The intelligence 
successes of the Second World War set a precedent that was impossible to replicate and post-
war performances of the JIC should not be judged in comparison. A 1952 minute perfectly 
summarised the JIC’s own view on the system:  
The British Intelligence machine in the UK is required to deal with a welter of 
miscellaneous subjects at top speed.  It might, in fact, be said without 
exaggeration that the machine is propelled by a succession of panics, due to 
insufficient time being available to deal with questions of the highest 
importance…one cause is undoubtedly the difficulty of sorting out the mass of 
detailed intelligence available into the form of reasoned appreciations.66 
 
The production of regular assessments at both strategic and tactical levels; the weekly 
forum for discussions between the most senior figures in intelligence, defence and foreign 
policy; the compiling of almost encyclopaedic references and orders of battle for different 
countries; and the capability to spring into action in crisis, ensured that the JIC was a vital 
instrument in defence, foreign and security policy-making.  Despite the Suez setback, by 1957 
the JIC’s position as a central tenet in governmental decision-making was secure.  Maurice 
Hankey’s 1935 belief that ‘there is a good deal which could be done to put our intelligence on 
a better footing’ had been realised.67 
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